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The term proposition usually denotes in quantum mechanics (QM) an element
of (standard) quantum logic (QL). Within the orthodox interpretation of QM the
propositions of QL cannot be associated with sentences of a language stating prop-
erties of individual samples of a physical system, since properties are nonobjective
in QM. This makes the interpretation of propositions problematical. The difficulty
can be removed by adopting the objective interpretation of QM proposed by one
of the authors (semantic realism, or SR, interpretation). In this case, a unified
perspective can be adopted for QM and classical mechanics (CM), and a simple
first order predicate calculus L(x) with Tarskian semantics can be constructed such
that one can associate a physical proposition (i.e., a set of physical states) with
every sentence of L(x). The set Pf of all physical propositions is partially ordered
and contains a subset Pf
T
of testable physical propositions whose order structure
depends on the criteria of testability established by the physical theory. In particu-
lar, Pf
T
turns out to be a Boolean lattice in CM, while it can be identified with QL
in QM. Hence the propositions of QL can be associated with sentences of L(x), or
also with the sentences of a suitable quantum language LTQ(x), and the structure
of QL characterizes the notion of testability in QM. One can then show that the
notion of quantum truth does not conflict with the classical notion of truth within
this perspective. Furthermore, the interpretation of QL propounded here proves
to be equivalent to a previous pragmatic interpretation worked out by one of the
authors, and can be embodied within a more general perspective which considers
states as first order predicates of a broader language with a Kripkean semantics.
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1. Introduction
It is often maintained in the literature on the foundations of quantum me-
chanics (QM) that the lattice of propositions of quantum logic (QL)a is a
logical calculus which is different from the classical logical calculus and spe-
cific of QM (see Ref. 1 for a review on this subject till the early seventies;
for a more recent perspective, together with an updated bibliography, see,
e.g., Refs. 2 and 3). Yet many scholars do not accept this view and argue
that QL is a mathematical structure with a physical interpretation, not a
new logic (for an explicit statement of this position see, e.g., Ref. 4).
In our opinion, the unsettled quarrel between the positions above finds
its roots in a specific feature of the standard interpretation of QM, that is,
nonobjectivity of physical properties. Because of this feature, there are sen-
tences attributing physical properties to samples of a given physical system
that are meaningful or meaningless (i.e., have or have not a truth value,
respectively) depending on the state of the object, and also sentences that
are meaningless in any case, even if they belong to the natural language
of physics (a known example of these is the statement “the particle x has
position ~r and momentum ~p at time t”). Hence the propositions of QL
cannot be connected in a direct way with sentences of this kind, follow-
ing standard procedures in classical logic (CL), which makes their logical
interpretation problematical (in particular, QL seems to introduce a new
mysterious concept of quantum truth5)b.
The above difficulties cannot be removed as long as nonobjectivity is
maintained to be an unavoidable feature of QM. Nevertheless most physi-
cists accept nonobjectivity, basing this acceptance on well known no–go the-
orems (the most famous of which are probably Bell’s6,7 and Bell–Kochen–
Specker’s7−9). It has been proven in a number of papers by one of the
authors, however, that these theorems, which are mathematically well es-
tablished, rest on assumptions which follow from implicitly adopting an
aFor the sake of brevity, we simply call quantum logic here the formal structure that
is called in literature concrete, or standard, (sharp) quantum logic,3 together with its
standard physical interpretation.
bA rather recent investigation on the concept of proposition has been done by Re´dei2.
Within Re´dei’s analysis physical properties, or sentences about probabilities of proper-
ties, are directly taken as elementary sentences of a logical language, and propositions
are identified with equivalence classes of (elementary or complex) sentences, each class
containing all sentences which are equivalent with respect to a quantum concept of truth.
Our analysis here considers a different kind of elementary sentences and introduces vari-
ous kinds of propositions. The lattice of Re´dei’s propositions is then isomorphic, in QM,
to the lattice of all testable physical propositions introduced here (Sec. 6).
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epistemological position which is suitable for classical physics but contrasts
with the operational philosophy of QM.10−16 To be precise, they assume
the simultaneous validity of a set of empirical physical laws in which the
observables that appear in some laws are incompatible with the observables
that appear in other laws, so that it is impossible, according to QM, to check
whether all the laws of the set hold simultaneously. This suggests that the
simultaneous validity assumption should be dropped in QM: but, then, the
no–go theorems cannot be proved. It follows that the nonobjectivity of
physical properties can no more be classified as a logical necessity, but only
as a (legitimate) interpretational choice, and alternative interpretations of
QM in which objectivity of properties is restored become possible. An in-
terpretation of this kind has then be constructed by one of us, together with
other authors (semantic realism, or SR, interpretation11−13,15,17,18). The
SR interpretation preserves the mathematical apparatus and the statistical
interpretation of QM, and yet considers every elementary sentence attribut-
ing a physical property to a given individual physical object as meaningful
(though its truth value may be empirically accessible or not, depending on
the state of the object).
Because of objectivity, the SR interpretation avoids the difficulties of the
standard interpretation pointed out above, so that physical propositions can
be introduced in QM associating them to sentences of a suitable classical
predicate calculus. This allows us to propound in this paper a general
scheme based on classical logic for the introduction of physical propositions
in physical theories, which can then be particularized to classical mechanics
(CM) and to QM. Our scheme explains, in particular, how QL can be
obtained by using a testability criterion for selecting a suitable subset in
the set of all physical propositions, and shows that a notion of quantum
truth can be derived from the classical notion of truth as correspondence
(as explicated rigorously by Tarski’s semantic theory19,20).
In order to favour a better understanding of the above results, let us
describe the content of the present paper in more details.
In Sec. 2 we construct a classical first order predicate calculus L(x), with
monadic predicates and one individual variable only, in which a classical
(Tarskian) notion of truth is adopted, and associate a family of individual
propositions, parametrized by the interpretations of the variable, with every
(open) sentence of L(x).
In Sec. 3 we define physical propositions, introduce the truth value
certainly true on L(x) (which adds without contradiction to the standard
values true/false), and study some properties of the poset (Pf ,⊆) of all
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physical propositions.
In Sec. 4 we conclude the general part of the paper by introducing the
subset PfT ⊆ P
f of all testable physical propositions, which is basic for
the analysis of measurement processes in the framework of specific physical
theories (as CM and QM).
In Sec. 5 we specialize the notions introduced in the previous sections to
CM. We show that, if suitable axioms (which are justified by the intended
interpretation) are introduced, the concepts of individual proposition, phys-
ical proposition and testable physical proposition can be identified, which
provides a very simple scheme that explains why people usually say that
“classical mechanics follows classical logic” (which is however a misleading
statement in our opinion).
In Sec. 6 we show that the different kinds of propositions introduced in
the general part cannot be identified in QM, and introduce some specific
axioms which are supported by the broad existing literature on QL. These
allow us to construct a quantum language LTQ(x), based on L(x), which is
such that the set of all physical propositions associated with its sentences
coincides with PfT and can be identified with the set of all propositions
of QL. It follows that every proposition of QL can be associated with a
sentence of a suitable first order predicate calculus, as in classical logic,
and that the set of all propositions of QL is selected on the basis of a
criterion of testability, which is tipically physical and shows the empirical
character of the lattice structure of QL.
In Sec. 7 we use the interpretation provided in Sec. 6 in order to look
deeper into the concept of ‘quantum truth’. We show that this concept di-
rectly follows in our approach from the concept of certainly true introduced
in the general part, hence it does not conflict with the classical concept of
truth. This provides a satisfactory unification of notions that are usually
regarded as incompatible.
In Sec. 8 we discuss the relations between the semantical interpretation
of QL provided in Sec. 6 with the pragmatic interpretation propounded
by one of us in a recent paper.21 We show that the two interpretations
can be easily translated one into the other, and that they are intuitively
equivalent.
In Sec. 9 we briefly comment on our approach from a general logical
perspective. We note that individual and physical propositions can be con-
sidered as propositions in a standard sense in CL if states are considered as
possible worlds (modal interpretation of QL). This interpretation is however
problematical, and we briefly sketch a possible alternative which refers to
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the broader language introduced by one of us, together with other authors,
in some previous papers.17,18
2. The language L(x)
The formal language that we want to construct in this section is a sim-
plified and modified version of the more general language introduced in
some previous papers17,18 with the aim of formalizing a sublanguage of the
observative language of QM.
The alphabet of L(x) consists of an individual variable x, a set E =
{E,F, . . .} of monadic predicates called properties, a set {¬,∧,∨} of logical
connectives and a set {( , )} of auxiliary signs.
The formation rules for sentences, or well-formed formulas (wffs), of
L(x) are the standard (recursive) formation rules for wffs of a classical first
order predicate calculus, in which ¬, ∧, ∨ denote negation, conjunction and
disjunction, respectively. We denote by φ(x) the set of all wffs of L(x), and
by E(x) the set of all elementary sentences (or atomic wffs) of L(x).
The semantics of L(x) consists of a family of Tarskian semantics
parametrized by a set S of states. Every S ∈ S is associated with a
universe US of physical objects. An interpretation of the variable x is a
mapping ρ : (x, S) ∈ {x} × S −→ ρS(x) ∈ US . For every S ∈ S and E ∈ E ,
an extension extSE ⊂ US is defined. The atomic wff E(x) is true in the
state S for the interpretation ρ iff ρS(x) ∈ extSE, false otherwise. The
truth value of molecular wffs of L(x) is then defined following standard
(recursive) truth rules in Tarskian semantics. For every interpretation ρ
and state S, we call assignment function the mapping σρS : φ(x) −→ {T, F}
(where T stands for true and F for false) which associates a truth value
with every wff of L(x) following the truth rules mentioned above.
The intended interpretation of L(x) is anticipated by the terminology
that we have adopted. States are defined operationally as classes of phys-
ically equivalent preparation procedures (briefly, preparations) and prop-
erties as classes of physically equivalent (ideal) registration procedures
(briefly, registrations)c. The universe US consists of samples of a prefixed
physical system Ω prepared according to any preparation in S. When-
ever an interpretation ρ and a state S are given, an elementary sentence,
say E(x), of L(x) states a (physical) property E of the physical object
cThe notion of physical equivalence is not trivial and requires a careful analysis of the
notions of preparation and (ideal) registration procedure.18 We do not insist on this issue
here for the sake of brevity.
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ρS(x) ∈ US (by abuse of language, we often avoid mentioning the interpre-
tation ρ in the following, and briefly say that E(x) attributes the property
E to the physical object x in the state S).
It must be stressed that the intended interpretation of L(x) provided
here implies that the semantics of L(x) is incompatible with QM whenever
the standard interpretation of QM is adopted. Indeed, within this interpre-
tation QM is maintained to be a semantically nonobjective (or contextual)
theory, which implies that the extension extSE is not defined for every
property E. Hence the general scheme for propositions in physical theories
propounded in this paper is based on an explicit acceptance of the SR in-
terpretation of QM mentioned in the Introduction, which is semantically
objective (we have already noted in the Introduction that the possibility of
such an interpretation follows from a criticism of the implicit assumptions
underlying the no–go theorems that should prove that QM is necessarily a
nonobjective theory).
It must also be stressed that the operational definition of properties as
classes of registrations makes every elementary wff E(x) ∈ φ(x) testable,
in the sense that a physical procedure exists that, under specified physical
conditions, allows one to check empirically the truth value of E(x). Yet,
it is important to observe that this check does not reduce in all theories
to registering a physical object x in the state S by means of a registration
in E. There are indeed physical theories, as QM, in which the registration
usually modifies the state S in an unpredictable way, so that the obtained
result refers to the state after the registration, not to S. In these theories
the empirical accessibility of the truth values of E(x) is then restricted to
a proper subset of states which depends on E (see Sec. 7).
Let us introduce now some further definitions. Firstly, two binary re-
lations of logical preorder ≤ and logical equivalence ≡ can be defined on
φ(x) by following standard procedures in classical logic, i.e., by setting, for
every α(x), β(x) ∈ φ(x),
α(x) ≤ β(x) iff
for every ρ ∈ R, S ∈ S, σρS(α(x)) = T implies σ
ρ
S(β(x)) = T,
and
α(x) ≡ β(x) iff α(x) ≤ β(x) and β(x) ≤ α(x).
It is then easy to see that the partially ordered set (briefly, poset) (φ(x)/≡,≤)
(where ≤ denotes, by abuse of language, the order canonically induced
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on φ(x)/≡ by the preorder ≤ defined on φ(x)) is a Boolean lattice (the
Lindenbaum–Tarski algebra of L(x)).
Secondly, let R be the set of all possible interpretations of x. Then,
we associate an individual proposition pρ
α(x) with every pair (ρ, α(x)) ∈
R× φ(x), defined as follows.
pρ
α(x) = {S ∈ S | σ
ρ
S(α(x)) = T }. (2.1)
The definition of pρ
α(x) implies that
σρS(α(x)) = T iff S ∈ p
ρ
α(x).
Furthermore, one easily gets that, for every elementary wff E(x) ∈ φ(x),
pρ
E(x) = {S ∈ S | ρS(x) ∈ extSE}, (2.2)
while for every α(x), β(x) ∈ φ(x) one gets
pρ
¬α(x) = S \ p
ρ
α(x), (2.3)
pρ
α(x)∧β(x) = p
ρ
α(x) ∩ p
ρ
β(x), (2.4)
pρ
α(x)∨β(x) = p
ρ
α(x) ∪ p
ρ
β(x) (2.5)
(where \, ∩, ∪ denote set–theoretical subtraction, intersection and union,
respectively). Let ⊆ denote set–theoretical inclusion and let Pρ be the set
of all individual propositions associated with sentences of φ(x) whenever ρ
is fixed. Then, Eqs. (2.3), (2.4) and (2.5) imply that also the poset (Pρ,⊆)
is a Boolean lattice.
Thirdly, by using the definitions of logical order, logical equivalence and
proposition introduced above, we get
α(x) ≤ β(x) iff for every ρ ∈ R, pρ
α(x) ⊆ p
ρ
β(x),
α(x) ≡ β(x) iff for every ρ ∈ R, pρ
α(x) = p
ρ
β(x),
which show that the logical relations on φ(x) imply set–theoretical relations
on every set Pρ of individual propositions.
3. The poset of physical propositions
The intended interpretation of L(x) introduced in Sec. 2 suggests to asso-
ciate a set of states with every sentence of L(x), to be precise the set of
states which make this sentence true whatever the interpretation of the vari-
able may be. Thus, for every α(x) ∈ φ(x) we define a physical proposition
pf
α(x), as follows.
pf
α(x) = {S ∈ S | ∀ρ ∈ R, σ
ρ
S(α(x)) = T }. (3.1)
October 30, 2018 13:15 Proceedings Trim Size: 9in x 6in proc˙gaso
8
By using the definitions introduced in Sec. 2, we then get
pf
α(x) = {S ∈ S | ∀ρ ∈ R, S ∈ p
ρ
α(x)} = ∩ρp
ρ
α(x). (3.2)
We denote by Pf the set of all physical propositions associated with wffs
of L(x), that is, we put
Pf = {pf
α(x) | α(x) ∈ φ(x)}. (3.3)
For every α(x) ∈ φ(x) we can now introduce the notion of “true with
certainty” by setting:
α(x) is certainly true in S iff S ∈ pf
α(x).
The new notion thus follows from the standard notion of truth intro-
duced in Sec. 2 and applies to open wffs of φ(x) independently of any
interpretation of the variable x (we note explicitly that we do not intro-
duce here a notion of certainly false in S : whenever S /∈ pf
α(x), we simply
say that α(x) is not certainly true in S).
The definition of physical proposition associated with a wff α(x) ∈ φ(x)
also allows us to introduce the new binary relations of physical preorder
and physical equivalence on φ(x). For every α(x), β(x) ∈ φ(x), we put
α(x) ≺ β(x) iff pf
α(x) ⊆ p
f
β(x),
α(x) ≈ β(x) iff pf
α(x) = p
f
β(x).
By comparing the definitions of ≺ and ≈ with the definitions of ≤ and ≡,
respectively, one gets
α(x) ≤ β(x) implies α(x) ≺ β(x),
α(x) ≡ β(x) implies α(x) ≈ β(x),
that is, logical preorder implies physical preorder and logical equivalence
implies physical equivalence. The converse implications do not hold in gen-
eral, in the sense that one cannot prove that they hold without introducing
further assumptions. We come back on this issue in Secs. 5 and 6.
Let us come now to the set Pf of all physical propositions. This set is
obviously partially ordered by set–theoretical inclusion, but the properties
of the poset (Pf ,⊆) depend on the specific physical theory that is consid-
ered. In particular, one cannot generally assert that (Pf ,⊆) is a Boolean
lattice, as (Pρ,⊆). However, some weaker features of it can be established.
Indeed, let α(x), β(x) ∈ φ(x). Then, the following statements hold.
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(i) pf
¬α(x) ⊆ S \ p
f
α(x),
(ii) pf
α(x)∧β(x) = p
f
α(x) ∩ p
f
β(x),
(iii) pf
α(x)∨β(x) ⊇ p
f
α(x) ∪ p
f
β(x)
(note that, generally, neither S \ pf
α(x) nor p
f
α(x) ∪ p
f
β(x) belong to P
f ;
statement (ii) shows instead that pf
α(x) ∩ p
f
β(x) belongs to P
f).
Let us prove statements (i), (ii) and (iii). By using Eqs. (3.2) and (2.3),
we get
pf
¬α(x) = ∩ρp
ρ
¬α(x) = ∩ρ(S \ p
ρ
α(x)) ⊆ S \ ∩ρp
ρ
α(x) = S \ p
f
α(x).
Furthermore, by using Eqs. (3.2) and (2.4), we get
pf
α(x)∧β(x) = ∩ρp
ρ
α(x)∧β(x) = ∩ρ(p
ρ
α(x) ∩ p
ρ
β(x)) =
= (∩ρp
ρ
α(x)) ∩ (∩ρp
ρ
β(x)) = p
f
α(x) ∩ p
f
β(x).
Finally, by using Eqs. (3.2) and (2.5), we get
pf
α(x)∨β(x) = ∩ρp
ρ
α(x)∨β(x) = ∩ρ(p
ρ
α(x) ∪ p
ρ
β(x)) ⊇
⊇ (∩ρp
ρ
α(x)) ∪ (∩ρp
ρ
β(x)) = p
f
α(x) ∪ p
f
β(x).
To close up, we note that the definitions of ≺ and ≈ on φ(x) imply that
the poset (φ(x)/≈,≺) (where ≺ denotes, by abuse of language, the order
canonically induced on φ(x)/≈ by the preorder ≺ defined on φ(x)) is order–
isomorphic to (Pf ,⊆).
4. The general notion of testability
The intended physical interpretation of L(x) suggests that a sentence of
L(x) can be classified as empirically decidable, or testable, iff it can be
associated with a registration procedure that allows one (under physical
conditions to be carefully specified, see Sec. 2) to determine its truth value
whenever an interpretation ρ of the variable x is given. Since all elementary
sentences are testable, one is thus led to define the subset φT (x) ⊆ φ(x) of
all testable wffs of φ(x) as follows.
φT (x) = {α(x) ∈ φ(x) | ∃Eα ∈ E : α(x) ≡ Eα(x)}. (4.1)
The subset PfT ⊆ P
f of all physical propositions associated with wffs of
φT (x) will then be called the set of all testable physical propositions. More
formally,
PfT = {p
f
α(x) ∈ P
f | α(x) ∈ φT (x)}. (4.2)
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Of course, φT (x) is preordered by the restrictions of the preorders ≤ and
≺ defined on φ(x) to it. For the sake of simplicity, we will denote preorders
and equivalence relations on φT (x) by the same symbols used to denote
them on φ(x). Hence, the logical preorder ≤ implies the physical preorder
≺, and the logical equivalence ≡ implies the physical equivalence ≈ also
on φT (x). We thus get two preorder structures, (φT (x),≤) and (φT (x),≺),
and two posets (φT (x)/≡,≤) and (φT (x)/≈,≺). The latter, in particular,
is isomorphic to (PfT ,⊆).
We shall see in the next sections some further characterizations of the
foregoing posets within the framework of specific theories.
5. Classical mechanics (CM)
It is well known that in classical mechanics (CM) all physical objects in
a given state S possess the same properties. This feature of CM can be
formalized here by introducing the following assumption.
CMS. For every S ∈ S and E ∈ E, either extSE = US or extSE = ∅.
It follows from assumption CMS that, for every interpretation ρ ∈ R,
ρS(x) ∈ extSE iff extSE = US , and ρS(x) /∈ extSE iff extSE = ∅. There-
fore, the assignment function σρS does not depend on the specific interpre-
tation ρ. More explicitly, for every interpretation ρ and state S,{
σρS(E(x)) = T iff extSE = US
σρS(E(x)) = F iff extSE = ∅
,
{
σρS(E(x) ∧ F (x)) = T iff extSE = US = extSF
σρS(E(x) ∧ F (x)) = F iff extSE 6= extSF
(where E,F ∈ E), etc.
Since σρS does not depend on ρ, neither the individual proposition p
ρ
α(x)
depends on ρ, and we can omit writing the index ρ in both symbols. Thus,
for every ρ ∈ R, the individual proposition associated with α(x) ∈ φ(x) is
given by
pα(x) = {S ∈ S : σS(α(x)) = T }. (5.1)
More explicitly, we have
pE(x) = {S ∈ S : extSE = US}, (5.2)
pE(x)∧F (x) = {S ∈ S : extSE = US = extSF} = pE(x) ∩ pF (x). (5.3)
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etc.
The set Pρ of all individual propositions associated with wffs of L(x)
obviously does not depend on ρ, and will be simply denoted by P . Because
of the above specific features, the general notions introduced in Secs. 2, 3,
4 particularize in CM as follows.
For every α(x), β(x) ∈ φ(x), and S ∈ S,
σS(α(x)) = T iff S ∈ pα(x),
α(x) ≤ β(x) iff pα(x) ⊆ pβ(x),
α(x) ≡ β(x) iff pα(x) = pβ(x).
It also follows from the general case that the Lindenbaum–Tarski alge-
bra (φ(x)/≡,≤) of L(x) is isomorphic to the Boolean lattice of individual
propositions (P ,⊆), so that the two lattices can be identified.
Coming to physical propositions, we get, for every α(x) ∈ φ(x),
pf
α(x) = pα(x), (5.4)
and, therefore, Pf = P . Thus, the set of all physical propositions coincides
in CM with the set of all individual propositions, and the notions of true
and certainly true also coincide.
Furthermore the intended physical interpretation suggests that every
sentence of the language L(x) is testable in CM. This inspires the following
assumption.
CMT. The set of all testable sentences of the language L(x) coincides in
CM with the set of all sentences of L(x), that is, φT (x) = φ(x) in CM.
Assumption CMT implies that PfT = P
f = P , whence
(PfT ,⊆) = (P ,⊆).
More explicitly, the poset of all testable physical propositions of a physical
system Ω coincides with the poset of all individual propositions of its lan-
guage L(x), and has the structure of a Boolean lattice. This result explains,
in particular, the common statement in the literature that “the logic of a
classical mechanical system is a classical propositional logic”.2 This state-
ment is however misleading in our opinion, since it ignores the conceptual
difference between individual, physical and testable physical propositions,
that coincide in CM only because of assumptions CMS and CMT.
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6. Quantum mechanics (QM)
We have stressed in Sec. 2 that our semantics (hence the general scheme
in Secs. 2, 3 and 4) is unsuitable for QM whenever the standard interpre-
tation of this theory is accepted. As anticipated in the Introduction and
in Sec. 2, we therefore adopt in the present paper the SR interpretation
of QM worked out by one of the authors and by other authors in a series
of articles,11−13,15,17,18 according to which extSE can be defined in every
physical situation (we show in Sec. 7 that the new perspective also allows
us to elucidate the concept of quantum truth underlying the standard in-
terpretation of QM). At variance with CM, it may then occur in QM that
∅ 6= extSE 6= US , so that the assignment function σ
ρ
S generally depends
on the interpretation ρ. The formulas written down for the general case
cannot be simplified as in Sec. 5. In particular, Pf 6= Pρ, assumptions
CMS and CMT do not hold, and PfT ⊂ P
f .
In order to discuss how the general case particularizes when QM is con-
sidered, let us briefly remind the mathematical representations of physical
systems, states and properties within this theory.
Let Ω be a physical system. Then, Ω is associated with a separable
Hilbert space H over the field of complex numbers. Let us denote by
(L(H),⊆) the poset of all closed subspaces of H, partially ordered by set–
theoretical inclusion, and let A ⊂ L(H) be the set of all one–dimensional
subspaces of H. Then (in absence of superselection rules) a mapping
ϕ : S ∈ S −→ ϕ(S) ∈ A (6.1)
exists which maps bijectively the set S of all pure states of Ω onto A (for the
sake of simplicity, we will not consider mixed states in this paper, so that
we understand the word pure in the following)d. In addition, a mapping
χ : E ∈ E −→ χ(E) ∈ L(H) (6.2)
exists which maps bijectively the set E of all properties of Ω onto L(H).
The poset (L(H),⊆) is characterized by a set of mathematical proper-
ties. In particular, it is a complete, orthocomplemented, weakly modular,
atomic lattice which satisfies the covering law.22−24 We denote by ⊥, ⋓
and ⋒ orthocomplementation, meet and join, respectively, in (L(H),⊆) (it
dIt follows easily that every pure state S can also be represented by any vector |ψ〉 ∈
ϕ(S) ∈ A, which is the standard representation adopted in elementary QM. Moreover,
a pure state S is usually represented by an (orthogonal) projection operator on ϕ(S) in
more advanced QM. However, the representation ϕ introduced here is more suitable for
our purposes in the present paper.
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is important to observe that ⋓ coincides with the set–theoretical intersec-
tion ∩ of subspaces of L(H), while ⊥ does not generally coincide with the
set–theoretical complementation ′, nor ⋒ coincides with the set–theoretical
union ∪). Furthermore, we note that A obviously coincides with the set of
all atoms of (L(H),⊆).
Let us denote by ≺ the order induced on E , via the bijective represen-
tation χ, by the order ⊆ defined on L(H). Then, the poset (E ,≺) is order–
isomorphic to (L(H),⊆), hence it is characterized by the same mathemati-
cal properties characterizing (L(H),⊆). In particular, the unary operation
induced on it, via χ, by the orthocomplementation defined on (L(H),⊆),
is an orthocomplementation, and (E ,≺) is an orthomodular (i.e., ortho-
complemented and weakly modular) lattice, usually called the lattice of
properties of Ω. By abuse of language, we denote the lattice operations on
(E ,≺) by the same symbols used above in order to denote the corresponding
lattice operations on (L(H),⊆).
Orthomodular lattices are said to characterize semantically orthomod-
ular QLs in the literature.3 The lattice of properties (E ,≺) is a less gen-
eral structure in QM, since it inherits a number of further properties from
(L(H),⊆), and can be identified with the concrete, or standard, sharp QL
mentioned in Sec. 1 (simply called QL here for the sake of brevity).
A further lattice, isomorphic to (E ,≺), will be used in the following. In
order to introduce it, let us consider the mapping
θ : E ∈ E −→ SE = {S ∈ S | ϕ(S) ⊆ χ(E)} ∈ L(S), (6.3)
where L(S) = {SE | E ∈ E} is the range of θ, and generally is a proper
subset of the power set P(S) of S. The poset (L(S),⊆) is order–isomorphic
to (L(H),⊆), hence to (E ,≺), since ϕ and χ are bijective, so that θ is
bijective and order–preserving. Therefore (L(S),⊆) is characterized by
the same mathematical properties characterizing (E ,≺). In particular, the
unary operation induced on it, via θ, by the orthocomplementation defined
on (E ,≺), is an orthocomplementation, and (L(S),⊆) is an orthomodular
lattice. We denote orthocomplementation, meet and join on (L(S),⊆) by
the same symbols ⊥, ⋓, and ⋒, respectively, that we have used in order
to denote the corresponding operations on (L(H),⊆) and (E ,≺), and call
(L(S),⊆) the lattice of closed subsets of S (the word closed refers here
to the fact that, for every SE ∈ L(S), (S
⊥
E )
⊥ = SE). We also note that
the operation ⋓ coincides with the set–theoretical intersection ∩ on L(S)
October 30, 2018 13:15 Proceedings Trim Size: 9in x 6in proc˙gaso
14
because of the analogous result holding in (L(H),⊆)e.
Basing on the above definitions, we now introduce the following assump-
tion.
QMT. The poset (PfT ,⊆) of all testable physical propositions associated
with statements of φT (x) (equivalently, with atomic statements of L(x))
coincides in QM with the lattice (L(S),⊆) of all closed subsets of S.
Assumption QMT is intuitively natural, and can be justified by using the
standard statistical interpretation of QM. We do not insist on this topic
here for the sake of brevity. We note instead that assumption QMT im-
plies that the posets (φT (x)/≈,≺) and (P
f
T ,⊆), on one side, and the lat-
tices (L(S),⊆), (L(H),⊆), (E ,≺) on the other side, are order–isomorphic.
Therefore also the operations of meet, join and orthocomplementation on
(φT (x)/≈,≺) and (P
f
T ,⊆) will be denoted by the symbols ⋓, ⋒ and
⊥, re-
spectively. The link of these operations with set–theoretical meet, join and
complementation in the set S of all states can be established as follows.
For every α(x), β(x) ∈ φT (x),
(pf
α(x))
⊥ ⊆ S \ pf
α(x), (6.4)
pf
α(x) ∩ p
f
β(x) = p
f
α(x) ⋓ p
f
β(x), (6.5)
pf
α(x) ∪ p
f
β(x) ⊆ p
f
α(x) ⋒ p
f
β(x). (6.6)
The isomorphisms above allow one to recover QL as a quotient algebra of
sentences of L(x). They, however, make intuitively clear that associating
the properties (or ‘propositions’) of QL with sentences of L(x) is not triv-
ial. The association requires indeed selecting testable wffs of φ(x), grouping
them into classes of physical rather than logical equivalence, adopting as-
sumption QMT, and, finally, identifying (L(S),⊆) with (E ,≺).
The isomorphisms above also suggest looking deeper into the links exist-
ing between the logical operations defined on φ(x) and the lattice operations
of QL. To this end, let us note that statements (i), (ii) and (iii) in Sec. 3,
eWhenever the dimension ofH is finite, the lattice (L(H),⊆) and/or the lattice (L(S),⊆)
can be identified with Birkhoff and von Neumann’s modular lattice of experimental
propositions, which was introduced in the 1936 paper that started the research on QL.25
This identification is impossible if the dimension of H is not finite, since (L(H),⊆) and
(L(S),⊆) are weakly modular but not modular in this case. Birkhoff and von Neumann’s
requirement of modularity has deep roots in von Neumann’s concept of probability in
QM according to some authors.2
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if compared with Eqs. (6.4), (6.5) and (6.6), respectively, yield, for every
α(x), β(x) ∈ φT (x),
pf
¬α(x) ⊆ S \ p
f
α(x) ⊇ (p
f
α(x))
⊥, (6.7)
pf
α(x)∧β(x) = p
f
α(x) ∩ p
f
β(x) = p
f
α(x) ⋓ p
f
β(x), (6.8)
pf
α(x)∨β(x) ⊇ p
f
α(x) ∪ p
f
β(x) ⊆ p
f
α(x) ⋒ p
f
β(x). (6.9)
Eq. (6.8) shows that, if α(x) and β(x) belong to φT (x), then α(x)∧β(x) be-
longs to φT (x), and establishes a strong connection between the connective
∧ of L(x) and the lattice operation ⋓ of QL. Eqs. (6.7) and (6.9) establish
instead only weak connections between the connectives ¬ and ∨, from one
side, and the lattice operations ⊥ and ⋒, from the other side. Hence, no
simple structural correspondence can be established between L(x) and QL.
One can, however, obtain a more satisfactory correspondence between
the sentences of a suitable language and the ‘propositions’ of QL by using
a fragment of L(x) in order to construct a new quantum language LTQ(x),
as follows.
First of all, we consider two properties E,F ∈ E and observe that,
since the mapping χ introduced in Eq. (6.2) is bijective, E and F coincide
whenever they are represented by the same subspace of L(H). This implies
that the following sequence of equivalences holds.
pf
E(x) = p
f
F (x) iff E = F iff E(x) ≈ F (x) iff E(x) ≡ F (x).
It follows in particular that every equivalence class of φT (x)/≈ contains
one and only one atomic wff of L(x). Since the set E(x) of all atomic wffs
of L(x) (Sec. 2) belongs to φT (x), we conclude that the correspondence
that maps every α(x) ∈ φT (x) onto the atomic wff Eα(x), the existence of
which is guaranteed by Eq. (4.1), is a surjective mapping. Moreover, this
mapping maps all physically equivalent wffs of φT (x) onto the same atomic
wff of E(x).
Secondly, let us consider the set φ∧(x) of all wffs of L(x) which either
are atomic or contain the connective ∧ only. Because of Eq. (6.8), the
proposition associated with a wff α(x) ∧ β(x) of this kind belongs to PfT ,
hence α(x) ∧ β(x) belongs to φT (x), so that φ∧(x) ⊆ φT (x). Then, let us
introduce a new connective ¬Q (quantum negation) which can be applied
(repeatedly) to wffs of φ∧(x) following standard formation rules for negation
connectives. We thus obtain a new formal language LTQ(x), whose set of
wffs will be denoted by φTQ(x). We adopt the semantic rules introduced
in Sec. 2 for all wffs of φ∧(x) ⊆ φTQ(x), and complete the semantics of
LTQ(x) by means of the following rule.
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QN. Let α(x) ∈ φTQ(x) and let a wff Eα(x) ∈ E(x) exist such that α(x) is
true iff Eα(x) is true. Then, ¬Qα(x) is true iff E⊥α (x) is true.
It is easy to see that rule QN implies that for every α(x) ∈ φTQ(x), an
elementary wff Eα(x) exists such that α(x) is true iff Eα(x) is true. This
conclusion has the following immediate consequences.
(i) One can define, for every interpretation ρ of the variable x and
state S, an assignment function τρS : φTQ(x) −→ {T, F}. Hence, a logical
preorder and a logical equivalence relation (that we still denote by the
symbols ≤ and ≡, respectively, by abuse of language) can be defined on
φTQ(x) by using the definitions in Sec. 2 with φTQ(x) in place of φ(x) and
τρS in place of σ
ρ
S .
(ii) One can associate a physical proposition with every α(x) ∈ φTQ(x)
by using Eq. (3.1) with τρS in place of σ
ρ
S . Hence a physical preorder and
a physical equivalence relation (that we still denote by the symbols ≺ and
≈, respectively, by abuse of language) can be defined on φTQ(x) by using
the definitions in Sec. 3 with φTQ(x) in place of φ(x) (one can also show
that ≈ coincides with ≡ on φTQ(x)).
(iii) The notion of testability introduced in Sec. 4 can be extended to
LTQ(x) by using Eq. (4.1) with φTQ(x) in place of φ(x), obtaining that
all wffs of φTQ(x) are testable. Hence, the set of all physical propositions
associated with wffs of φTQ(x) coincides with P
f
T .
It follows from (ii) and (iii) that (φTQ(x)/≈,≺) is isomorphic to the
lattice (PfT ,⊆), so that these two order structures can be identified.
The set of connectives defined on LTQ(x) can now be enriched by intro-
ducing derived connectives. In particular, a quantum join can be defined
by setting, for every α(x), β(x) ∈ φTQ(x),
α(x) ∨Q β(x) = ¬Q(¬Qα(x) ∧ ¬Qβ(x)). (6.10)
It is then easy to show that the following equalities hold.
pf
¬Qα(x)
= (pf
α(x))
⊥, (6.11)
pf
α(x)∧β(x) = p
f
α(x) ⋓ p
f
β(x), (6.12)
pf
α(x)∨Qβ(x)
= pf
α(x) ⋒ p
f
β(x). (6.13)
The equations above establish a strong connection between the logical op-
erations defined on φTQ(x) and the lattice operations of QL. Hence, a
structural correspondence exists between LTQ(x) and QL, and the latter
can be recovered within our general scheme also by firstly considering the
October 30, 2018 13:15 Proceedings Trim Size: 9in x 6in proc˙gaso
17
set of all elementary wffs of L(x), and then constructing LTQ(x) and the
quotient algebra (φTQ(x)/≈,≺). It is now apparent that the semantic rules
for quantum connectives have an empirical character (they depend on the
mathematical representation of states and properties in QM and on as-
sumption QMT) and that they coexist with the semantic rules for classical
connectives in our approach (the deep reason of this is, of course, our adop-
tion of the SR interpretation of QM). In our opinion, these conclusions are
relevant, since they deepen and formalize a new perspective on QL that has
been propounded in some previous papers10−18 and is completely different
from the standard viewpoint about this kind of logic.
To conclude, let us observe that a further derived connective −→
Q
can be
introduced in φTQ(x) by setting, for every α(x), β(x) ∈ φTQ(x),
α(x) −→
Q
β(x) = (¬Qα(x)) ∨Q (α(x) ∧ β(x)). (6.14)
One can thus recover within LTQ(x) the Sasaki hook, the role of which is
largely discussed in the literature on QL.2,3,24
7. Quantum truth
The general notion of certainly true introduced in Sec. 3 is defined for all
wffs of L(x). Yet, according to our approach, only wffs of φT (x) can be
associated with empirical procedures which allow one to check whether they
are certainly true or not. Whenever α(x) ∈ φT (x), the notion of certainly
true can be worked out in order to define a verificationist notion of quantum
truth (Q–truth) in QM, as follows.
QT. Let α(x) ∈ φT (x). Then, we put:
α(x) is Q–true in S ∈ S iff S ∈ pf
α(x);
α(x) is Q–false in S ∈ S iff S ∈ (pf
α(x))
⊥;
α(x) has no Q–truth value in S ∈ S (equivalently, α(x) is Q–
indeterminate in S) iff S ∈ S \ (pf
α(x) ∪ (p
f
α(x))
⊥).
It obviously follows from definition QT that α(x) is Q–true in S iff it is
certainly true in S.
Definition QT can be physically justified by using the analysis of the
notion of truth in QM recently provided by ourselves26 and successively
deepened by one of us.21 We only note here that it is equivalent to defining
a wff α(x) ∈ φ(x) as Q–true (Q–false) in S iff:
(i) α(x) is testable;
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(ii) α(x) can be tested and found to be true (false) on the physical object
x without altering the state S of x.
The proof of the equivalence of the two definitions is rather simple but
requires some use of the laws of QM (see again Refs. 21 and 26).
It is apparent that the notions of truth and Q–truth coexist in our ap-
proach. Indeed, a wff α(x) ∈ φ(x) is Q–true (Q–false) for a given state S
of the physical system iff it belongs to φT (x) and it is true (false) inde-
pendently of the interpretation of the variable x (equivalently, iff it belongs
to φT (x) and can be empirically proved to be true or false without alter-
ing the state S of x). This realizes an integrated perspective, according to
which the classical and the quantum conception of truth are not mutually
incompatible.21,26,27 However, definition QT introduces the notion of Q–
truth on a fragment only (the set φT (x) ⊂ φ(x)) of the language L(x).
If one wants to introduce this notion on the set of all wffs of a suitable
quantum language, one can refer to the language LTQ(x) constructed at
the end of Sec. 6. Then, all wffs of φTQ(x) are testable, and definition QT
can be applied in order to define Q–truth on LTQ(x) by simply substituting
φTQ(x) to φT (x) in it. Again, classical truth and Q-truth may coexist on
LTQ(x) in our approach.
Let us close this section by commenting briefly on the notion of truth
within standard interpretation of QM. Whenever this interpretation is
adopted, the languages L(x) and LTQ(x) can still be formally introduced,
but no classical semantics can be defined on them because of the impos-
sibility of defining, for every S ∈ S and E ∈ E , extSE (see Sec. 2). One
can still define, however, a notion of Q–truth for LTQ(x). Indeed, one can
firstly introduce a mapping χ : α(x) ∈ φTQ(x) −→ Eα ∈ E by means of
recursive rules, as follows.
For every α(x) ∈ φTQ(x), χ(¬Qα(x)) = E⊥α ,
For every α(x), β(x) ∈ φTQ(x), χ(α(x) ∧ β(x) = Eα ⋓ Eβ .
Then, one can associate a physical proposition pf
α(x) ∈ L(S) with every
α(x) ∈ φTQ(x) by setting p
f
α(x) = θ(Eα). Finally, one can define Q–truth on
φTQ(x) by means of definition QT, independently of any classical definition
of truth.
It is apparent that the above notion of Q–truth can be identified with
the (verificationist26) quantum notion of truth whose peculiar features have
been widely explored by the literature on QL (in particular, a tertium non
datur principle does not hold in LTQ(x)). Hence, the interpretation of QL
as a new way of reasoning which is typical of QM seems legitimate. But
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this widespread opinion is highly problematical. Indeed, whenever S is
given, some wffs of φTQ(x) have a truth value, some have not, quantum
connectives are not truth–functional and the notion of truth appears rather
elusive and mysterious.5 Accepting our general perspective provides instead
a reinterpretation of the notion of truth underlying the standard interpre-
tation of QM, reconciling it with classical truth, and allows one to avoid
the paradoxes following from the simultaneous (usually implicit) adoption
of two incompatible notions of truth (classical and quantum).
8. The pragmatic interpretation of QL
The definition of Q–true in S as certainly true in S for wffs of φT (x) in
Sec. 7 suggests, intuitively, that the assertion of a sentence α(x) of φT (x)
should be considered justified in S whenever α(x) is Q–true in S, unjustified
otherwise. This informal definition can be formalized by introducing the
assertion sign ⊢ and setting
⊢ α(x) is justified (unjustified) in S iff
α(x) is Q–true (not Q–true) in S.
The set of all elementary wffs of φT (x), each preceded by the assertion
sign ⊢, can be identified with the set of all elementary assertive formulas
of the quantum pragmatic language LPQ introduced by one of the authors
in a recent paper21 in order to provide a pragmatic interpretation of QLf .
The set ψQA of all assertive formulas (afs) of L
P
Q is made up by all afore-
said elementary afs plus all formulas obtained by applying recursively the
pragmatic connectives N , K, A to elementary afs. For every S ∈ S a prag-
matic evaluation function πS is defined which assigns a justification value
(justified/unjustified) to every af of ψQA and allows one to introduce on ψ
Q
A
a preorder ≺ and an equivalence relation ≈ following standard procedures.
More important, a p–decidable sublanguage LPQD of L
P
Q can be constructed
whose set φQAD of afs consists of a suitable subset of all afs of ψ
Q
A which
have a justification value that can be determined by means of empirical
procedures of proof (in particular, all elementary afs of ψQA belong to φ
Q
AD).
LPQD can then be compared with the quantum language LTQ(x) introduced
f It must be noted that the pragmatic interpretation of QL has some advantages with
respect to the interpretation propounded in Sec. 6. In particular, it is independent of
the interpretation of QM that is accepted (standard or SR), while our interpretation in
this paper follows from adopting a classical notion of truth, hence from accepting the
SR interpretation of QM.
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at the end of Sec. 6 by constructing a one–to–one mapping τ of φTQ(x)
onto φQAD, as follows.
For every E(x) ∈ φTQ(x), τ(E(x)) =⊢ E(x),
For every α(x) ∈ φTQ(x), τ(¬Qα(x)) = N ⊢ α(x),
For every α(x), β(x) ∈ φTQ(x), τ(α(x) ∧ β(x)) =⊢ α(x)K ⊢ β(x),
For every α(x), β(x) ∈ φTQ(x), τ(α(x) ∨Q β(x)) =⊢ α(x)A ⊢ β(x).
Indeed, it is rather easy to show (we do not provide an explicit proof here
for the sake of brevity) that the mapping τ preserves the preorder≺ and the
equivalence relation ≈ (in the sense that α(x) ≺ β(x) iff τ(α(x)) ≺ τ(β(x)),
and α(x) ≈ β(x) iff τ(α(x)) ≈ τ(β(x))). Moreover, the wff α(x) ∈ φTQ(x)
is Q–true iff the af τ(α(x)) ∈ φQAD is justified, which translates a semantic
concept (Q–true) defined on the language LTQ(x) into a pragmatic concept
(justified) defined on the pragmatic language LPQD. Bearing in mind our
comments at the end of Sec. 6, we can summarize these results by saying
that QL can be interpreted as a theory of the notion of testability in QM
from a semantic viewpoint, a theory of the notion of empirical justifica-
tion in QM from a pragmatic viewpoint. The two interpretations can be
connected, via the mapping τ , in such a way that Q–true transforms into
justified, which is intuitively satisfactory.
9. Physical propositions and possible worlds
The formal language L(x) introduced in Sec. 2 is exceedingly simple from
a syntactical viewpoint, even if it is very useful in order to illustrate what
physicists actually do when dealing with QL. Its syntactical simplicity has
forced us, however, to set up a somewhat complicate semantics, in which,
in particular, states are formally treated as possible worlds of a Kripke–
like semantics. A less intuitive but logically more satisfactory approach
should provide an extended syntactical apparatus, simplifying semantics.
This could be done by enriching the alphabet of L(x) in two ways:
(i) adding a universal quantifier (with standard semantics);
(ii) adding the set of states as a new class of monadic predicates of L(x).
Let us comment briefly on these possible extensions of L(x). Firstly, let
(i) only be introduced. Then, a family of individual propositions can be
associated with the quantified wff (∀x)α(x), and a proposition p(∀x)α(x) =
∩ρp
ρ
α(x) can be associated with it. Hence, we get
pf
α(x) = p(∀x)α(x)
October 30, 2018 13:15 Proceedings Trim Size: 9in x 6in proc˙gaso
21
which provides a satisfactory interpretation of the physical propositions
introduced in Sec. 3 and of the related notion of certainly true.
Second, let us note that considering states as possible worlds is a com-
mon practice in QL,3 but it doesn’t fit well with the standard logical in-
terpretation of possible worlds. In order to avoid this problem, one could
introduce (ii), as one of us has done, together with other authors, in several
papers.17,18 In this case, states are not considered possible worlds, propo-
sitions as defined in the present paper are not propositions in the standard
logical sense (rather, an ‘individual proposition’ associated with a wff α(x)
is the set of all states which make a sentence of the form S(x) → α(x)
true in a given interpretation of x, while a ‘physical proposition’ is a set of
‘certainly yes’ states which make a sentence of the form (∀x)(S(x)→ α(x))
true). We do not insist here on this more general scheme, and limit ourselves
to observe that it is compatible with a standard Kripkean semantics, which
can be enriched by introducing physical laboratories in order to characterize
the truth mode of empirical physical laws in more details and connect the
notions of probability and frequency.17,18 Yet, of course, an approach of this
kind would make much less direct and straightforward the interpretation of
QL that we have discussed in this paper.
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